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Abstract 
[Excerpt] When plants close down, workers are usually desperate for a remedy. In these tragic 
circumstances, the prospect of a worker buy-out to keep the plant operating has overwhelming appeal. 
The role unions play can determine whether or not the rescue attempt is successful. 
If unions stand on the sidelines debating the merits of a buyout attempt while financiers and corporate 
managers put together a deal, they will pay dearly for their passivity. If they take the lead in organizing the 
rescue attempt, however, they can create viable enterprises that will give their members job security. 
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When plants close down, workers are usually desperate for a 
remedy. In these tragic circumstances, the prospect of a worker 
buy-out to keep the plant operating has overwhelming appeal. The 
role unions play can determine whether or not the rescue attempt 
is successful. 
If unions stand on the sidelines debating the merits of a buy-
out attempt while financiers and corporate managers put together 
a deal, they will pay dearly for their passivity. If they take the lead 
in organizing the rescue attempt, however, they can create viable 
enterprises that will give their members job security. 
South Bend Lathe in Indiana represents one of the most dramatic 
examples of an ESOP gone wrong. Because the union responded 
to a management initiative at South Bend rather than organizing 
a buy-out on its own, the buy-out deal included terminating the 
union pension plan. The ESOP plan also prohibited employees 
from voting their stock. The management at South Bend Lathe 
has recently shifted a significant portion of the company's 
production to South Korea. 
At Dan River, Inc.—a 12,000-employee, Virginia-based textile 
manufacturer—an ESOP was used by management as a defensive 
tool against a hostile takeover. While the managers succeeded in 
keeping their jobs, the union workers had their pension plan 
terminated, received a class of stock that was ten times more 
expensive than management's stock and gained absolutely no 
influence over their company. 
• Craig Livingston is a labor lawyer in the Newark, New Jersey firm of Ball, Hayden, 
Kiernan, Livingston and Smith, which represents numerous unions—including 
United Autoworkers Locals 736, 271 and 1827. Livingston was involved in the 
worker buy-outs at Hyatt-Clark, Atlas Chain and Seymour Specialty Wire. 
0 
36 LABOR RESEARCH REVIEW 
The experience of three UAW locals suggests that strong and 
active unions can structure companies that maximize worker 
ownership, control and democratic participation on the shop floor. 
More importantly, by becoming the dominant force in the buy-
out, unions can effectively protect their members' jobs and 
structure a fairer deal for the workers. 
In August 1980, when General Motors announced it would sell 
or close its Hyatt Roller Bearing Plant in Clark, New Jersey, the 
leaders of UAW Local 736 thought of buying the plant as a last 
ditch effort. They asked their members to fund a feasibility 
study—the first step in determining if an enterprise is economically 
possible. The local membership was divided, and the proposal was 
defeated by sixteen votes out of nearly 1500 votes cast. Failure 
to get the full support of the members at this early stage weakened 
the influence the union was able to exercise throughout the 
process. 
At Hyatt-Clark, however, local General Motors executives joined 
with the union leaders to form a Job Preservation Committee with 
every member voluntarily paying $ 100 to join. Soon the committee 
had $120,000 and was ready to begin the process. 
After a corporate law firm was hired, a major consulting firm 
did the feasibility study, which showed that the future of the 
company was promising if wages and benefits were reduced, the 
work force diminished and management made more efficient. 
With the favorable feasibility study, $53 million was obtained from 
local banks, insurance companies, and General Motors to buy and 
operate the company. 
When the company was formed in 1981, the workers took a cut 
in pay and benefits in exchange for a bonus plan and an incentive 
plan written into the collective bargaining agreement. Three out 
of thirteen seats on the Board of Directors were allotted to union 
members, and stock was distributed on the basis of service. In 
1991, when the major loans are paid off, the union will have 
increased its number of seats on the Board of Directors to six, the 
same as management, with the thirteenth selected jointly. 
Although the buy-out has kept 1400 employees working, the 
involvement of corporate attorneys in the takeover prevented the 
workers and their union from having control of the deal and, 
hence, of the new company. This has resulted in the continuation 
of the internal struggles between union and management that 
characterized the company prior to the takeover. The struggle has 
been between management wanting the usual hierarchical, 
undemocratic system and the union pressing for as much worker 
control as possible. The union has continued with some success 
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to work for a greater voice in the company. For example, during 
1983, the union nominated and sucessfully fought for the hiring 
of the company's plant manager. 
The collective bargaining agreement at Hyatt-Clark was renewed 
on January 31, 1985. The union leadership won even greater 
control over the company as well as parity with management in 
wage increases. The union's strategy employed both traditional 
tools of collective bargaining as well as newly learned tools of 
corporate finance. However difficult the course, the union at Hyatt 
has never been stronger and more united. 
UAW Locals 271 and 1827. 
At Atlas Chain Company in Northeast Pennsylvania, the members 
of UAW Local 271 were not merely faced with the threat of a plant 
closing. Their employer had actually shut down in April of 1983. 
The average age of the workers in this economically depressed 
corner of the state is 48. Most had spent their entire working lives 
at the company. The prospects for a buy-out appeared bleak 
because the company had lost money for the preceding six years. 
But UAW 271 leadership would not accept defeat. 
With the active support of the International Union, the local 
union led the buy-out from beginning to end. It was the local 
union's leaders, working with their lawyers, who sculpted the new 
company. From the very beginning, the union and its leaders were 
in charge. The local management, the corporate lawyers, the 
accountants, and the other consultants were never the decision-
makers. The local union raised the money to hire the professionals, 
approached the lending institutions, and lined up bi-partisan 
political support in Washington and Harrisburg. 
As a result of the broad political and community support Local 
271 gathered for the buy-out, one-third of the debt was borrowed 
at an average fixed interest rate of 4^2% annually, with a partial 
deferral of principal repayments. Through this leadership role the 
union chose the president of the company, negotiated his salary, 
nominated four of the seven directors on the Board, and assured 
that the stock of the Atlas Chain Company would be distributed 
on the basis of service rather than salary. In August of 1986, the 
union membership will, at its regular meeting, choose the entire 
Board of Directors of the company on the basis of one person, 
one vote. 
The union-picked president of the company has demonstrated 
a management style that is all too unusual in American business-
he actually is the leader of the company. His and the union's 
leadership has made the first year of Atlas Chain Company's 
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financial life far better than could have been predicted during the 
six-month period the plant was shut down prior to the takeover. 
At the end of 1984, Atlas had some 80 people working and was 
hiring. 
At Seymour Specialty Wire Company (formerly Bridgeport 
Brass), UAW Local 1827 initiated the buy-out as a result of a 
suggestion by the Connecticut Area Director of the UAW, Tom 
Curtin. 
The financing for the feasibility study and the consultants was 
obtained from the seller of the company. An elected steering 
committee was chosen and, in October of 1984, five of the nine 
directors were elected by all of the employees of Seymour. (Four 
of five of those directors were members of management.) At this 
writing, the employee buy-out at Seymour is scheduled for early 
1985—amid high hopes that 200 of the company's 250 union 
employees will retain their jobs. Both the new tax law, which 
makes loans to ESOPs very attractive for banks, and the 
experiences of its sister UAW locals have made Local 1827's path 
to the buy-out far smoother. 
Lessons 
The lessons from the experience at Hyatt, Atlas and Seymour are 
as simple to state as they were difficult to accomplish. Worker 
ownership, control and shop-floor participation will be achieved 
only through strong, democratic unions. 
Practically, this means unions must initiate and continue to be 
the leading force in the buy-out. The union alone, and not 
management, should raise the funds to hire the consultant for the 
feasibility study. If the study determines that the buyout is feasible, 
it is the union that must assemble the team of accountants, 
corporate lawyers and investment bankers to put the deal together. 
The union must hire the best possible management team and 
negotiate the salaries they will receive. The structure of the ESOP 
and of the new company must institutionalize workers' ownership, 
control and participation. 
The main fiscal task the union faces is to persuade lending 
institutions that the proposed new company, with worker 
ownership and control, will be well-run and profitable. The raising 
of capital is a critical task that should never be delegated by the 
union and its labor counsel. More than any other part of the 
transaction, these negotiations with lenders ultimately determine 
the nature of the company and the power relations within it. 
ESOPs need to be studied and mastered by America's unions. 
Local unions should be able to go the International Unions for 
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ed by America's unions. 
Unions for 
advice and assistance. Every international union has the potential 
for becoming a resource center and planner. Ultimately, ESOPs 
can become one part of a capital strategy that labor should master 
to empower unions and workers. 
The UAW workers at Hyatt-Clark Industries, Atlas Chain, and 
Seymour Specialty Wire provide an important lesson for the labor 
movement. Unions that are informed about the potential of 
employee ownership can play an important role in dealing with 
plant closings and capital flight. • 
How ESOPS Work 
In a worker buy-out, an Employee Stock Ownership Plan 
(ESOP) may be illustrated as follows: 
The workers of the closing company (we'll call it "Oldco") 
establish a new company ("Newco"), which, in turn, creates 
an ESOP Trust. The ESOP Trust borrows $ 100 million from 
a bank. 
(The 1984 tax law provides that commercial banks can take 
a 50% deduction for interest income which they receive for 
loans made to ESOPs. As a result, certain asset-based lenders 
are offering commercial loans at interest rates as low as 77% 
of the prime interest rate. The loan is secured by the assets 
of the old company and a guarantee of repayment by the 
new company.) 
The ESOP then uses the loan to purchase $ 100 million worth 
of Newco stock. The $100 million Newco receives for the 
sale of this stock to the ESOP is used to buy Oldco's plant, 
equipment and inventory for $80 million, and $20 is left for 
working capital. Each year thereafter, Newco makes a 
contribution to the ESOP so that the ESOP gradually pays 
off the bank loan. As the loan is repaid, stock passes into 
accounts for individual workers. 
Unlike conventional financing mechanisms, an ESOP 
permits a company to repay both principal and interest in 
pre-tax dollars, resulting in obvious tax savings to the new 
company. 
